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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 Intrusion Detection is a broad and complex field in cybersecurity. There are varieties of existing 
methods with varying degrees of success, which attempt to classify various types of traffic as 
benign, or attacking. A tool that can do this consistently and reliably, and with minimal overhead 
is ideal, benefiting with respect to analysis overhead, as well as level of information privilege.  
This paper attempts to provide such a tool through packet sequence analysis.  
Packet sequence, as referred to in this paper, is the order and number of the exchange of packets. 
Sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) analysis is done on the sequence history of each pair of 
IP addresses in attempt to determine if the flow can be classified as an attack based solely on 
this. SPRT is performed for single class, two class, and with more specialized attack classes.  
Through manipulation of a large variety of parameters and analysis of results indicated that 
packet sequence can, under the right circumstances provide an indication of an attack. While this 
is true most of the attacks seen in the data tested, there is a high level of parameter tuning process 
involved. While likely not all attacks will be identifiable by this method, for those attacks which 
do not appear readily and obviously useful, there are several which show promise with different 
configurations of parameters, and could potentially be useful with a higher degree of tuning.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The incentive for an effective IDS with very little overhead or data needed exists in a variety of 
applications. Oftentimes an ideal IDS is configured as an IPS, that is Intrusion Prevention 
System. In this case the system needs to be in-line like a firewall, perform the analysis on live 
data and traffic packets must meet certain criteria in order to pass through the firewall or it will 
be dropped. Oftentimes even a basic firewall gets overwhelmed in this configuration, especially 
under large bandwidth situations. Under these circumstances a device might go into failover 
mode, which either slows network traffic to a crawl, or allows it to continue un-analyzed, 
bypassing the protection measures [1]. For this reason, in a situation like this it is important to 
keep the processing overhead to a minimum, and avoid creating a network speed bottleneck, 
while still maintaining an effective level of detection.  
Sometimes other factors eliminate the possibility for deeper network inspection aside from the 
large volume or processing required, with this as the case, the incentive for such a system is in 
the need for very little data, and no identifiable information from packets. With encryption as 
common and useful as it is today, it often allows cyber criminals to take advantage of this by 
attacking over an encrypted channel such as SSL or SSH [2] [3]. Attackers can for example 
disguise traffic of planted malware over encrypted channels and remain indistinguishable from 
legitimate traffic. Even when the payload is encrypted, addresses are still available, being 
required by routers and network systems for delivery. This information can be used without 
needing to access the more complex information potentially held.  
As the proposed analysis likely requires training on both legitimate, and malicious data, ISPs are 
potentially a massive source of information regarding both types of network traffic. However 
there are also many scenarios where data sharing is prohibited by legal consequence, or some 
other disincentive. The need for a proposed system is high in cases such as this as well, needing 
virtually none of this protected data. For example HIPPA regulations or an organizations 
reluctant to allow other access to customer or otherwise sensitive data.   In these situations the 
proposed scheme could still benefit as an intrusion detection system where many or most others 
might not be able to. A step further, in stripping even more identifying data and obfuscating the 
IP addresses involved, but leaving the flow intact will still allow the algorithm to function and 
user privacy may still be preserved.  
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The motivation and inspiration for this project comes from attacks where an out-of-order, or 
abnormal pattern of packets, is used to disrupt or attack systems. Noticing and identifying this 
behavior could be key to minimalistic-ally identifying an attack, especially if it is unique to a 
certain attack method.  In contrast, even classifying attacks as abnormal or unlikely given a set of 
background data would prove useful to intrusion detection. 
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CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK AND OTHER METHODS 
Intrusion detection as a field is a large area of security, cyber and otherwise. This paper aims to 
implement a network based IDS, analyzing network data with the purpose of looking for attacks 
and anomalies. Network intrusion detection is not a new field, some of its origins seen in 1987 
and frequently added to since [4]. But there are ever evolving techniques and strategies, we see 
everything from open source systems like Snort and Bro, with community developed 
customizable tools, to highly commercialized systems like FireEye with sophisticated analysis 
techniques [5] [6] [7]. A common feature of these systems is gathering statistics about the traffic, 
or subsets of the traffic and examining with various data analysis methods these features often 
involve potentially protected data, or [8].  Applications of lightweight protocols that use only a 
subset of data such as SSHCure have been attempted before on network traffic to detect ongoing 
attacks [3]. A lightweight method such as SSHCure gives promise that the minimal method is 
possible.  
Markov Chains are certainly not new to the broad field of anomaly detection, having been used 
to examine standard and abnormal video conditions, and are not new to the field of security [9]. 
Applications of Markov Chains, and Hidden Markov Models, in network analysis with the goal 
of intrusion and anomaly detection have been attempted, and successful previously, though other 
methods generally examine phases of an attack as states of a Hidden Markov Model rather than 
network data points [10] [11]. Columbia University describes the problem of information 
sharing, with large organizations and internet service providers being reluctant to share data that 
may prove useful to collaborate in intrusion detection. They do this by attempting to anonymize 
user data and preventing Markov Chain timing attacks from taking place as an attempt to 
correlate user identities [12]. Additional advancements in this regard are important to ensure that 
anonymous sharing of data, along with a continued support of user privacy are essential to 
computer security. This paper aims to show another method which will allow data sharing for 
attack and anomaly detection, and still preserve user privacy. 
In attempt to reduce the impact of the network bottleneck problem that many intrusion 
prevention systems face, some turn to high speed, specialized hardware. This hardware 
acceleration requires a very static algorithm however, and the constantly evolving methods of 
attackers prevent use of this for every part of the algorithm, though it can still be beneficial. This 
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type of device may also be useful in the proposed system, though reduction of data required 
could make it more effective, or even less necessary. While some of these devices have very 
impressive statistics, they provide little headway to the issue of user anonymity. This paper aims 
to build on this theory of non-disruption through exploration of data-lightweight analysis 
algorithms.  
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CHAPTER 3. EXPERIMENT CONCEPTS 
The algorithm this paper intends to build for analysis relies heavily on several mathematical 
concepts. An introduction to each, along with a general context is included with basic examples. 
Each is described as it relates to the other concepts relevant to the experiment performed. A 
discussion of how each will be applied to the context of networks appears in Chapter 4 below.  
Markov Chains   
A Markov Chain is a mathematical way of representing the states in a system. This system could 
be the anything from the current base a runner is on to as complex as the state of a computer 
register [13]. What a Markov Chain does is attempt to represent the probability of a transition 
from one state to another possible state. From a simple example, the state of a coin flip, it is 
obvious that a coin can flip either a heads or tails, and at each stage, the probability of 
transitioning to either heads or tails on the next flip is each 0.5. This can be seen in the diagram 
below, with the states as circles, and the arrows and numbers representing probability transitions 
between.  
 
Figure 1 Markov Chain Example Diagram 1, Coin Flip 
Though this is a very simple system, more complex cases can be captured with a similar 
diagram. Note that for each state, the probabilities of transitions exiting the state must add up to 
1, including a possibility of remaining in the same state. That is some transition must occur, even 
a transition which maintains the current state. A more involved example representing the 
hypothetical states of weather: sunny, rainy, and windy is included below. Note the similar 
properties to above.  
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Figure 2 Markov Chain Example Diagram 2, Weather Prediction 
This same Markov Chain information can be captured in a matrix as well, and is oftentimes more 
useful. The current states are listed vertically, and the next potential states are listed horizontally. 
Note that like the sum of transition probabilities, represented above as arrows must be equal to 1, 
with a matrix each row must do the same. Both examples previously demonstrated as chains are 
converted to matrixes and included below.  
             Sunny Rainy Windy 
 H T  Sunny 0.7 0.25 .05 
H .5 .5  Rainy 0.2 0.5 0.3 
T .5 .5  Windy 0.15 0.3 0.55 
Figure 3 Markov Chain Example Matrices 
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In practice the transition values of a Markov Chain are often not readily known, in these cases a 
sample of observations is taken in order to estimate the states. The current state is observed, 
allowed to proceed to the next state, and the transition recorded as a sample. This process is 
repeated many times until a sufficient sample is taken and the chain is trained. Note that while 
we can observe it, Markov Chains as represented do not take into consideration any state history. 
A standard Markov Chain captures is the transition between two states, meaning that there is no 
allowed dependency on the states leading up to the one represented. In a sufficiently sampled 
chain, transition probability will be accurate considering all possible histories. In practice there 
may indeed be other dependencies, which are explored through order, and a pseudo-time 
dependency later.  It may be possible to calculate a better certainty for transition probability if 
the history leading up to is also considered, taking into account the previous n states 
encountered.   
This is where the concept of a Markov Chain with history is introduced.  In the case of a true 
random variable, such as the coin flip, introducing any history will have no effect, given enough 
sampling to sufficiently train the Markov chain. This can be seen with the order 2 example 
included below. 
 T H 
H, H .5 .5 
H, T .5 .5 
T, H .5 .5 
T, T .5 .5 
Figure 4 Markov Chain Example Diagram 2nd Order 
There are other cases however, where a history may prove useful, such as the weather prediction 
example. Had history not been considered, the first three states shown, and to be precise: six 
more that are not, would all be included in one row for a single order chain. This allows better 
predictions to be made than when considering only a first order chain, showing a dependency on 
the previous transitions, or the state history.  
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 S R W 
S, S, S 0.65 0.15 0.2 
R, S, S 0.1 0.05 0.85 
W, S, S 0.55 0.25 0.2 
…    
W, R, W 0.2 0.6 0.2 
W, W, W 0.3 0.5 0.2 
Figure 5 Markov Chain Example Diagram 3rd Order 
Though increasing the order drastically may seem like an intuitive way to increase the precision 
when predicting state transitions, it is not without drawbacks. As can be seen by the matrix 
above, the number of rows is increased from just 3 with a first order to 18 with a third order. Or 
generally with an n-order, and the k size alphabet of possible states, increasing n by one will 
increase the number of rows necessary by a factor of k. In an n order Markov Chain, kn rows are 
necessary to maintain all possible states.  Along with this increase in space this increase comes a 
reduction in the amount of training done on each row. On average, for every row ending with a 
particular state, an n order increase will lead to the number of samples used for the training will 
be reduced by a factor of kn. Thus a large number of additional samples may be necessary to 
sufficiently train a matrix to the same degree of confidence. 
Once a Markov Chain is trained regardless of order, it is possible to observe a transition and 
determine the probability of the same transition occurring within a given matrix. Using this 
method an indication can be determined of how similar the circumstances in which the matrix 
was trained are to the circumstances under which the transition was observed.  
SPRT Algorithm and Log Likelihood ratio 
The Log Likelihood ratio is a method of measuring which of two classes an object is more likely 
to be a member of [14]. Given the probability of a sampled transition belonging to each of the 
classes, we assign one hypothesis class as the positive direction, and the other as the negative. 
These hypothesis classes will come from another mechanic, as it relates to the scope of his paper, 
this sample will come from a trained Markov Chain as described above. The log of the ratio is 
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then taken, which by logarithm algebraic rules can be written two equivalent ways in Formula 1 
below. The log will be positive if the ratio is greater than one, meaning the positive hypothesis is 
more likely and a negative log indicates the negative hypothesis is more likely.  
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝛬(𝑥) = 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (
𝑃1(𝑦|𝑥)
𝑃2(𝑦|𝑥)
) = 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃1(𝑦|𝑥)) − 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃2(𝑦|𝑥))  
Formula 1 
Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) is a technique used for sequences in the classification 
problem. In this context SPRT is an extension of the likelihood ratio seen above that can be used 
when events occur in sequence, and are observed a common set of circumstances. For example, 
it can be used as a sampling algorithm for quality control, samples are taken from a set of 
product, and through SPRT, the batch can be determined to be either good or bad, the positive or 
negative hypothesis [15] [16]. Formally, SPRT is the sum of the log likelihood ratio, or the log of 
the ratio of membership probabilities. Si below represents the score of the i
th  state, and log 𝛬(𝑥) 
is from Formula 1 above.  
𝑆𝑖 = 𝑆𝑖−1 + log 𝛬(𝑥)  
Formula 2 
This SPRT function can be visualized graphically, by plotting for value with respect to the 
number in the sequence. This lets the algorithm show how confident the sequence is to belong to 
either the positive or negative hypothesis. Ideally these graphs will clearly diverge and allow for 
immediate and obvious classification, an example of a graph that demonstrates this is included 
below. For the purposes of this paper, a positive event is when a flow would be classified as 
attack positive. That is, a positive indicates there is an attack present in the flow’s SPRT chart.  
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Figure 6 SPRT Two Class Expected 
 
In practice these graphs may not be well grouped, and may not diverge as quickly and cleanly as 
hoped, this means that false positives or negatives are likely. However because of the charted 
nature it is easy to define a threshold scheme to select classes. A simple linear fit line can be 
used, though more complex methods are clearly possible. A simple example is included below 
for reference. 
 
Figure 7 SPRT Threshold Example 
With the solid lines as various SPRT series, and the dotted line as the defined linear threshold, 
we see that most of these series are easily classified as above or below the threshold, and this is 
the ideal case. It is very possible however to have a sequence which crosses threshold multiple 
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times as demonstrated by the yellow line above. With only one threshold line each sequence 
would be determined upon the first observation, this is not what we want. Sone alternatives are to 
pay attention to the number and severity of the times a sequence crosses, a difference integration 
of sorts. Another simpler is to have two threshold lines with an ‘unknown zone’, and making a 
decision based upon this.   
 
Figure 8 SPRT Threshold Example 2 
With the two horizontal lines we more easily see an unknown zone where blue and yellow 
originate, then are soon after classified. It is also possible however, that an attacker may 
purposefully or be forced to exhibit normal user behavior for a period of time. This could be an 
unintentional part of attacking, perhaps involved in establishing a channel, or perhaps 
intentionally attempting to beat the classification system. In this case the flow of an attacker will 
still have large periods of decrease as the SPRT is charted. An example of what this may look 
like is included below. A good threshold idea for the classes should be able to detect and account 
for this behavior, and still classify as an attack. This could be seen, and accounted for by a sloped 
threshold, requiring that a flow behave well throughout the entirety of the attack in order to 
continue to be classified as legitimate.  
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Figure 9SPRT Threshold Example 3 
It can easily be imagined that a significant variety of possible schemes for which to classify the 
SPRT flows. Specific parameters will depend on the nature of the scenario, as well as the desired 
false positive and negative rates.  
SPRT Variants 
In some cases it may be beneficial to adjust the SPRT algorithm in attempt to more quickly or 
more accurately classify a sequence. The adjustment this paper examines is assigning a weight to 
the training of a particular scenario. The classes to be examined in this analysis are for 
membership of an estimated Markov Chain. Because these chains are estimated from training, a 
confidence multiplier can be assigned corresponding to how well the distribution for a transition 
from a given state has been trained. The general theory is that state transitions which have seen 
more, and thus are better trained, will be given a higher weight and allowed to affect the SPRT 
chart more.  Because the value is a ratio, this confidence multiplier should be assigned 
corresponding to the more minimally trained Markov Chain. This modifies Formula 2 as seen 
above as follows.  With the number of times the row ‘x’ in a matrix is trained, as P(x)i-train, and 
‘trained’ is an integer value where the matrix is then considered trained, and additional data 
points should not increase the confidence For the purposes of this experiment the trained value is 
set to consider 1000 packets sufficiently trained.  
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𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒:   𝐶 = min (
min (𝑃(𝑥)1−𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 , 𝑃(𝑥)2−𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛)
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑
, 1) 
Formula 3 
𝑆𝑖 = 𝑆𝑖−1 + C ∗ log 𝛬(𝑥)  
Formula 4 
SPRT can be extended to consider cases where there is only one, and where there are n classes. 
For one class extension, the algorithm only needs to track the numerator of the LLR. Note that in 
this case, because a logarithm is negative on the (0-1) interval, the SPRT graph will be always 
decreasing. It would expect that a member of the class will have high probability and remain 
close to the horizontal axis, while a non-member will have low probability and decrease greatly. 
Threshold schemes for this scenario can be applied similarly to those examined above.  
 
Figure 10 SPRT One Class Expected 
If SPRT is extended to more than two classes, the easiest solution is to perform one class 
analysis on each, and determine which class fits most optimally.  Alternatively, and perhaps 
more effectively each can be compared to a reference class, consisting of background ‘normal’ 
noise as this paper later demonstrates. This requires scaling in the number of tests, and class 
training required to increase by a factor of the number of classes. In a cybersecurity context a 
class for each attack type would grow extremely quickly with the large variety of attacks which 
already exist, increasing the necessary computation of the system proposed.  
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CHAPTER 4. NETWORK APPLICATION OF SPRT 
In this paper, an attempt is made to classify network traffic through flow sequence patterns. 
Chapter 3 above discussed the mathematical concepts used in general to facilitate this process. 
This chapter is a description of how these tools relate to the network classification scenario, as 
well as how the algorithm of the experiment is performed. 
Markov Chain Formation 
For the scope of this paper a Markov state involves the sequence of packets between two hosts, 
we will refer to this sequence of events and the IPs associated a Flow. Regardless of the protocol, 
an exchange of packets takes place and the sequence contained is observable. The sequence can 
be gathered through sniffing, a custom network tap, pcap files, or a variety of other sources. 
Even with a variety of sources possible, in applications where information is sensitive, the 
appropriate transitions can be extracted and used to train a matrix. Sharing this matrix will not 
violate privacy of any sort, as once trained, each transition is indistinguishable from others and 
any context outside of any transition history included. Pseudocode of this transition extraction 
process is included in this sub section.  
When observing a flow sequence from any packet source, we use the following algorithm. Note 
that a flow, will have defining keys corresponding to the pair of IP addresses associated. A 
packet will as well, and thus the corresponding flow can be reference from a packet. 
 
Figure 11 Pseudo Code For Flow Extraction 
For each packet encountered: 
 If the flow corresponding to the packet exists in the dictionary:   
  Check the direction, if it is forwards: 
   Increase a counter kept for each flow, to reflect the number of packets seen in that direction   
  If it is backwards: 
   Append the current counter value to a list representing the history 
   Reset the counter back to one    
 If there is no flow that corresponds to the packet: 
  Initialize the flow in the dictionary 
  Initialize the counter of the flow to 0 
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This algorithm builds the flows that the defined states of the Markov chain can then come from. 
In practice we need to put a practical limit on the maximum number of packets recorded in one 
direction in a row, or the number of states in the Markov Chain will scale to be infinite in size. 
This value is set to 10 for the experiment and results discussed following. These flows have a 
history of the following form, where a, b … are positive integers between zero and the practical 
limit. 
[a, b, c, d ] -> e 
When examining a packet for the Markov chain sample the n order history must be considered, 
in order to attempt to take into account the beginning and ending of a sequence, leading and 
trailing zeros are added to the sequence, so for a 3 order Markov Chain, this is modified as 
follows. 
[0, 0, 0, a, b, c, d, e, 0] 
This allows the algorithm to use an n-wide sliding window approach to retrieve the state 
transitions. Continuing with the current example, the state transitions this flow gives us for an 
order 3 history are: 
[0, 0, 0] -> a; [0, 0, a] -> b; [0, a, b] -> c; [a, b, c] -> d; [b, c, d] -> e; [c, d, e] -> 0 
The algorithm then can use these transitions to train a matrix with the x -> y pairs by increasing 
counts in the corresponding position of the matrix. A sufficient amount of this data from benign 
traffic will train a matrix, and allow the algorithm to test the probability of membership with the 
SPRT algorithm.  This test is performed whenever a transition is observed in the flow, the 
probability of the current counter value is measured given the corresponding flow history in the 
matrix. For the example flow above, a subset of the transitions would be determined as follows.  
𝑃1(𝑎|[0,0,0]),     𝑃1(𝑐|[0, 𝑎, 𝑏]),     𝑃1(0|[𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒]) 
For visualization purposes, the process would be to take the given Markov Matrix: P1, find the 
given row: [a, b, c], and locate the appropriate column: e. The probability at this location is what 
is used in LLR and SPRT as described below.  
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LLR and SPRT 
LLR and SPRT can be performed according to the several variants above. Given the trained 
matrices, SPRT can easily be plotted relative to one or two classes, and results examined for a 
threshold possibility. One Class, Two Class and Multi Class are all performed in the scope of this 
paper. For the purposes of this paper, in the multi-class case of this experiment, attack types are 
known and in order to save computational time, SPRT is only performed for each attack flow 
relative to that corresponding attack matrix. However in practice this is not possible, as an 
unknown flow cannot be evaluated against a single known attack if the attack is unknown. This 
will lead to a much more complex analysis process, scaled by a factor of the number of attack 
matrixes used.   
Pseudo Time Dependency 
A common behavior of attacks is to attempt to ignore protocol when establishing a channel, this 
might be done by sending out of order packets in attempt to exploit a vulnerable machine like the 
TCP split handshake attack, or sending a large number of packets initially to try to overwhelm a 
host like they SYN Flood attack [17] [18]. If this behavior occurs, it is likely to happen in the 
first several packet exchanges of a flow. In order to more fully account for this behavior, an 
additional dimension of the Markov Chain is taken into account, a pseudo timing of sorts.  
The number of the sequence in the flow will be the extra dimension that is also used to train, and 
to test the probability of membership to a class. The idea being that the initial sequence is not 
drowned in the Markov Chain by the volume of packets that are not part of this initial sequence. 
If a distinction is noticeable in an attack very early in the flow, this method should make the 
divergence more obvious, and the difference apparent early in the SPRT Graph.   
In practice the first 10 steps of the flow sequence are recorded in a corresponding matrix and all 
remaining are recorded in the same steady state matrix. So the transitions seen in a flow to be 
tested are evaluated against the same sequence number in the reference matrixes.  
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DARPA Dataset 
MIT and DARPA released datasets for the evaluation of intrusion detection systems, it consists 
of 7 weeks of training data, with a number of labeled attacks, and background data, as well as 2 
weeks of testing data in the same format, though consisting of a higher portion of attack data 
[19]. For this project a subset of the 1998 set is used for testing and training. Network traffic files 
were separated into normal or background data, and the distinct labeled attacks.  These attacks 
are used for training and testing both as an all encompassing group, and individually according 
the different class scenarios described above.  
Appendix A contains data counts, and histograms for the Markov Matrix associated with the 
background, and attack data sets used in training of the following experiments. Note that for the 
attack data, Appendix A only contains information about the jointly trained attack chain used in 
the Two Class case. For the Multi Class and individual attack chains, see the corresponding 
appendix containing more information about the attack type.  
There were 25 distinct attack types sampled from the DARPA data. All were used to train the 
attack Markov Chain in the Two Class case described and evaluated in Chapter 5.  
18 
 
CHAPTER 5.  RESULTS 
Because of the large number of attack types included in the DARPA 1998 Data, and a large 
number of variables examined, this section has selected and focuses mainly on 4 interesting 
attacks. Portscan, Multihop, Satan, and Warez, as labeled by DARPA. For completed results of 
these attacks see Appendices B – E including descriptions, histograms, and SPRT graphs of 
results. Relevant graphs are also included for discussion within this chapter when relevant. SPRT 
Charts are generated by plotting different parameter scenarios of attack data in red, against the 
same subset of background data, evaluated with the same parameters as the attack data, in blue.  
Effect of Order 
Intuitively, if a chain is able to be sufficiently trained, increasing the order will only increase the 
accuracy of predictions, as described above in section two. For example if an attacker makes an 
unlikely move within a low order chain, it will negatively affect the probability, and SPRT at few 
steps. But the same unlikely move will be present for the n steps, and impact the ratio for all n. 
For demonstration, below the order 1, 2, and 3 Two Class SPRT graphs for the Warez attack are 
included as a reference.  
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Figure 12 Warez,  Order 1 
 
Figure 13 Warez, Order 2 
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Figure 14 Warez, Order 3 
As seen by the above charts, order has the effect of narrowing the grouping of both the attack 
and the background data, with the exception of outliers. This is a very useful effect, as it would 
allow for tighter thresholds and ideally fewer false positives and negatives. Though the graphs in 
general look promising, it is important to note the presence of several good reference flows still 
overlaid, and some even lower with the general grouping of attack flows, which would surely 
violate any thresholds set under this scenario.  
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Figure 15 Multihop Order 1 
 
Figure 16 Multihop, Order 3 
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As can be seen, the observations noted above hold true for other types of attacks as well, over the 
same number of sequence, the grouping of the Multihop attack flows grow closer with an 
increase from order 1 to order 3.   
 
Figure 17 Satan, Order 1 
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Figure 18 Satan, Order 2 
Once again, a similar effect on the increase of order is observed. While not all attack traffic 
could be correctly classified without false positives, a threshold which will capture all attack 
flows will include a small subset as false positives.   
Effect of Weight 
In attempt to compensate for a lack of attack training data, the weighted SPRT function Formula 
4 above is applied. The background reference matrix is significantly better trained than any of 
the attack matrixes, likely sufficiently falling above the trained threshold from Formula 3 in all 
transitions. For the attack reference matrix however this is less likely, both due to the lower 
availability of data, as well as a more narrow slice of traffic, which will likely populate a fewer 
variety of transitions. We again investigate the two class scenario for weighted and unweighted 
versions and explore the effect on captured data. In addition to two class we fix the order of the 
Markov history chain to 2.  
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Figure 19 Satan, Order 2, Unweighted 
 
Figure 20 Satan, Order 2, Weighted 
25 
 
In this scenario, it appears that the weighting formula actually had a negative effect on the SPRT 
graphs. As stated above, it is set to 1000 for the duration of experiments performed in this paper.  
Though of interesting note, every flow appears to have a very similarly probable initial sequence, 
noted by the first four graphed values having very minimal change. This introduces a new area 
for exploration, if a deviation in this initial control sequence is noticed, should the SPRT values 
be affected more significantly. This is later explored through the pseudo timing algorithm.  
 
Figure 21 Warez, Order 2, Unweighted 
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Figure 22 Warez, Order 2, Weighted 
Contrary to what is shown in Satan above, Warez produces truly unreliable results. It appears 
that because matrices are overwhelmingly better trained on background data, that attack traffic 
continues almost indistinguishable from background traffic because of a proportionately low 
degree of confidence compared to the background matrix.  
Unfortunately it appears that weighting the SPRT formula has not helped to compensated for a 
lack of training. It is possible that this is partially to do with an interesting finding related to the 
training distributions discussed in Chapter 5, which indicates that the matrix may be sufficiently 
well trained with fewer data points than expected.  
Effect of Classifiers 
Because SPRT is ultimately a sum of ratios, in the most general case we must have two reference 
points or hypotheses for which to compare effectively, though the one class SPRT variant 
discussed in Chapter 4 above is a possibility. The other possibility is the multi class case also 
introduced in Chapter 4 above. In this instance the flows in question are compared against a 
more precise matrix, trained only on a specific type of attack. Up until this point the results this 
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paper have discussed have been what we refer to as the two class case for consistency. That is, 
all available attack data is used to train the reference classifier. While this give us a balanced 
efficiency scenario between a potentially large number of Markov Matrixes required, and failing 
to be too specific when testing for membership to an attack class, other options should also be 
explored for their effect on the SPRT. In attempt to classify an unknown attack the single class 
method is also included. In an attempt to classify an attack as belonging to a Markov Chain 
consisting of all attacks, two class is used. In practice single or two class may be used as a sort of 
pre processor classification to classify most normal traffic, and reduce the flows for which multi 
class is performed. Multi class is an attempt to narrow the scope of the attack classification to 
just one type. By training the attack Markov Chain on a single attack type it may be more 
obvious a flow is a member of that particular class rather than when only compared to the 
general attack class. For the scope of this section we again fix order 2 and examine unweighted 
ratios.  
 
Figure 23 Portsweep, Order 2,  Unweighted, Single Class 
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Figure 24 Portsweep, Order 2, Unweighted, Two Class 
 
Figure 25 Portsweep, Order 2, Unweighted, Multi Class 
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Initially Portsweep should be noted as one of the most obvious forms of attack to identify with 
this classification scheme, as it is a scan against one address. There are possibly multiple 
concurrent connections, leading to higher numbers for each stream of packets, or step of the 
flow’s history as seen by our context. This should appear unusual compared to other background 
traffic, which should have low counts for each stream of packets. Even under this observation, 
we see that the one flow of packets classified under this scenario becomes increasingly more 
obvious through an increase in Markov Chain precision. While Portsweep appears obvious even 
in the single class, the two class is evermore clear. The attack flow is the only line that even 
crosses the horizontal 0-axis within the first 25 steps. In the Multi class the difference is even 
more apparent. The closest flow at step 26 to the two class was around a score of 5 away. In the 
multi class the end score is decreased further still, with a score almost doubling from -5 to -10.  
 
Figure 26 Satan, Order 2, Unweighted, Single Class 
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Figure 27 Satan, Order 2, Unweighted, Two Class 
 
Figure 28 Satan, Order 2, Unweighted, Multi Class 
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Observing Satan attack data, it is the most difficult of the selected attacks to classify, the single 
class SPRT is essentially worst case, with one representation of the attack going in a completely 
opposite end of the background reference data. Observation based solely on this would lead an 
analyst to almost immediately seek alternate methods for detecting the attack. When we continue 
and examine the two and multi class cases, the results look much better. In each case only 3 to 5 
background flows are seen between the two, this is much more optimal than the wildly 
encompassing Satan flows seen with one class SPRT. The significant improvements in this 
regard demonstrate the possibility of the method to identify the attack traffic through increased 
precision.  
Effect of Pseudo Time Dependency 
Because the effect of timing requires the equivalent of an increase in order of the size of the 
Markov Chain, the experiment is only performed for first and second order, though all other 
parameters are still manipulated as seen above. A complete listing of the SPRT graphs for these 
selected attacks is included in the appropriate appended section.  
 
Figure 29 Warez, Order Two, Unweighted, Two Class, No Time Dependency 
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Figure 30 Warez, Order Two, Two Class, Unweighted, Pseudo Time Dependency 
  
Comparing the above two graphs, when the pseudo timing scheme is introduced the grouping 
significantly improves for both background and attack data. While it does not appear that the 
classification would be decided any sooner by a threshold, within the first 10 steps affected, it 
does give opportunity for better threshold scheme later in the sequence. In addition, an outlier 
background flow that previously scored below all of the attack data has scored higher, 
significantly more in line with other reference data, with the introduction of this time 
dependency, indicating a potential reduction in the false positive rate as well.  
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Figure 31 Satan, Order One, Unweighted, Multi Class, No Time Dependency 
 
Figure 32 Satan, Order One, Unweighted, Multi Class, Pseudo Time Dependency 
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While the previous Warez example indeed looked promising, it appears that in other cases, such 
as Satan above the timing scheme has the opposite effect. The Two attack flows actually become 
less grouped, and a threshold scheme which selects both attack flows will incur significantly 
more false positives than it would have without this dependency. It is very likely that this is due 
to a training issue, as training the attack matrix with so few flows gives almost no data points for 
which to reference the first several transitions, and deviation of an attack even slightly in the 
several time-dependent steps, from previously seen similar attacks will give poor performance. 
Other Interesting Results 
Initially the practical limit on packet sequence was decided to be 10, that is, anything above 10 
packets from a flow in order, in one direction would be counted as the same thing for the Markov 
Chain’s purposes. The intent was to for this number to be sufficient enough to distinguish the 
majority of flows. This limit was established somewhat arbitrarily, but it appears that in practice 
it could have been much smaller, as seen below by a sample of the first order histograms from 
the appendixes. In these graphs the X axis corresponds to the different histories possible, or in 
other terms the rows of the matrices described in Chapter 3. The Y axis is a logarithmically 
scaled integer of the amount of times the Markov Chain was trained for that particular history, or 
as discussed above, each possible history representing a distribution.   
 
 
Figure 33 Good/Background Data Histogram 
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Figure 34 Bad Training Data Histogram 
 
 
Figure 35 Reference Good Background Histogram 
As can be seen the overwhelming majority in all cases comes from one and two counts, as would 
likely be expected for network traffic in general. Under this scheme the limit likely could have 
just as easily been set lower, to say 5, and similar results been yielded, while reducing the size of 
the matrix to an n order fraction of the original size.   
The above observations of an unsuccessful weighting scheme are supported by similar training 
histograms below. The training and testing datasets look very similar, even with one consisting 
of approximately 100 times the number of transitions 
 
Figure 36 Portweep Testing Data Histogram 
36 
 
 
Figure 37 Portsweep Training Data Histogram 
While the value of the graph for the background data is significantly higher, it is very 
proportionate to the values seen in the histogram for the testing data, and would tend to give very 
similar probabilities when tested for membership.  
Drawbacks 
While this method does prove effective with certain attack scenarios, and generally 
manipulations made increases the amount of grouping observed, or separation of attack and 
background traffic. This does not come without a price however. One of the goals of the project 
was to remain a saleable and fast algorithm. Each extra insight or dimension to a transition 
introduced increases the processing overhead significantly, often by a factor of the number of 
states. While this is necessary to a point, and it is not immediately an issue, the more this is 
increased, the more complex the algorithm becomes, and the less useful as an in-line method of 
intrusion prevention it will become. The multi class method in particular, the scaling required 
with the number of attacks becomes very large. While this does allow for additional performance 
tuning options, simply by turning on and off the checks against a particular attack Markov Chain, 
to test for all such attacks would be a computationally intensive ordeal.  
Another potential issue is network architecture. While testing for this issue was not done, 
Markov Chains trained on different network parameters may look very different. For example if 
payload size is limited, then the same channel between two hosts may look very different on 
another network. This could likely be, and should be circumvented by using a training matrix 
derived from traffic seen on the network to be tested, but this solution prevents data sharing 
between areas with different architecture. In this matter the monitoring algorithms could even be 
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distributed on a subnet or host based system for increased granularity and more precise 
background Markov Chains.   
This highlights another issue that reference data may be difficult to provide. Attack Markov 
chains could be given as a sort of indicator, and compared against carefully gathered and 
analyzed reference data in an enterprise or collaborative system. But because background data 
needs to be trained on an individual setup, background data without any attacks could be difficult 
to provide. Another tool will be necessary to remove attacks, this potentially being an existing 
solution, and be able to train the matrix on the cleaned data. Without an existing method of 
evaluating for clean data, the attack free background Markov Chain could prove difficult to train.   
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CHAPTER 6. FUTURE WORK 
As a general rule it is of note that the more finely grained analysis that can be performed, the 
more likely it is to yield useful results. There are additional data points from network traffic that 
could be used to further examine flows and potentially produce notable results. However this 
should be proceeded with caution, as any additional data from specific packets will stray from 
one of the primary goals of the project, that is to maintain a low level of information so that the 
tool can be used in data and privacy sensitive scenarios. In addition, more complex data 
processing can be explored, extra dimensions added, but is once again subject to violation of a 
primary goal of the project, increasing the computational overhead and reducing the usefulness 
for an in-line system. 
A next possible step in further examining flow sequences is to look more closely at the direction 
of the first packet. This will separate cases where a sub sequence might be likely to be seen as 
the initial part of a connection, an in for example inbound VPN, whereas an outbound VPN may 
be more suspicious. Exploring this method may make some attacks more apparent in this regard.  
There are also a large number of possible ways in which the traffics could be separated for 
analysis ahead of time, through the protocol, distributing the algorithm for each host, or 
segmented networks. However it is important to consider when exploring these options that 
additional complexity may violate one of the goals of the project, as each time traffic is separated 
in any form, at least an additional training matrices are necessary. 
Additional evaluation of the system is likely necessary, a direct comparison to existing intrusion 
detection systems for example. The testing and implementation of a threshold system would also 
need to be applied for this evaluation to take place. While very possible, there are several steps 
before the project can reach that goal.  
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 
This project explored a new avenue for the field of traffic classification. Using a minimal amount 
of data from network traffic, this paper was able to implement a method for characterizing a flow 
as a sample of a Markov Chain. These Markov Chains were then used as classifiers, and SPRT 
analysis performed. Using standard and defined variants to SPRT, grouping and separation of 
classes was shown, indicating the possibility of a classification scheme to identify attacks or 
abnormalities. Parameters explored for varied SPRT methods included all combinations of 
history degree, weighting, number of classifiers, and the introduction of a pseudo time 
dependency. All of these evaluations were done for four of the attacks seen in the DARPA 1998 
intrusion detection dataset and compared to a subset of reference normal data.  
While there are many possible avenues left to explore for this approach, this form of 
classification test has shown to indicate potential success at classifying network attacks with 
fairly high degrees of accuracy. The system can likely be utilized as both an online and offline 
analysis system, to prove useful in detecting attacks or anomalies.  Some issues do potentially 
exist with the setup and deployment process, but the method shows sincere potential as an 
effective method for classifying attack traffic, and should be included in future research into the 
intrusion detection field.  
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APPENDIX A. TRAINING AND REFERENCE DATASET HISTOGRAMS 
 
Background / Good is the data used in all experiments performed as a reference to normal. 
All Attack is the data used in all two class experiments. This is the chain trained on each attack 
Reference is the standard blue data used to evaluate attack classification against. A subset of the 
blue lines are plotted against each attack to better compare success of each attempt 
Table A1. Data Counts 
 Good/Background All Attack  Reference Good 
Flows 14205 4464 1970 
Transitions 3876442 508720 453722 
Packets 6239514 1047127 1484289 
 
Background / Good Training Data Histograms 
 
Figure A1. Order 1 Background / Good Training Data Histograms 
 
Figure A2. Order 2 Background / Good Training Data Histograms 
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Figure A3. Order 3 Background / Good Training Data Histograms 
 
All Attack Data Histograms 
 
Figure A4. Order 1 All Attack Training Data Histograms 
 
Figure A5. Order 2 All Attack Training Data Histograms 
 
Figure A6. Order 3 All Attack Training Data Histograms 
 
44 
 
Reference Background Data Histograms 
 
Figure A7. Order 1 Reference Good Training Data Histograms 
 
Figure A8. Order 2 Reference Good Training Data Histograms 
 
Figure A9. Order 3 Reference Good Training Data Histograms 
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APPENDIX B. MULTIHOP ATTACK DATASET SPRT GRAPHS 
Multhop is a set of attacks from the 1998 DARPA intrusion detection evaluation dataset. 
Included for reference is an organized listing of SPRT graphs calculated under explained 
Conditions. 
DARPA Description:  Multi-day scenario in which a user first breaks into one machine 
Table B1. Data Counts 
 Training Testing 
Flows 2 2 
Transitions 4480 7137 
Packets 7275 9407 
 
Training Dataset 
 
Figure B1. Multihop Order 1 Training Dataset Histogram  
 
Figure B2. Multihop Order 3 Training Dataset Histogram  
 
Figure B3. Multihop Order 3 Training Dataset Histogram  
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Testing Data Histograms 
 
Figure B4. Multihop Order 1 Testing Dataset Histogram  
 
 
Figure B5. Multihop Order 2 Testing Dataset Histogram  
 
 
Figure B6. Multihop Order 3 Testing Dataset Histogram  
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SPRT Graphs 
Figure B7. Order One, One class, Unweighted 
 
 
Figure B8.Order One, One class, Weighted 
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Figure B9. Order One, Two class, Unweighted 
 
 
Figure B10. Order One, Two class, Weighted 
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Figure B11. Order One, Multi class, Unweighted 
 
 
Figure B12. Order One, Multi class, Weighted 
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Figure B13. Order Two, One class, Unweighted 
 
 
Figure B14. Order Two, One class, Weighted 
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Figure B15. Order Two, Two class, Unweighted 
 
 
Figure B16. Order Two, Two class, Weighted 
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Figure B17. Order Two, Multi class, Unweighted 
 
 
Figure B18. Order Two, Multi class, Weighted 
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Figure B19. Order Three, One class, Unweighted 
 
 
Figure B20. Order Three, One class, Weighted 
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Figure B21. Order Three, Two class, Unweighted 
 
 
Figure B22. Order Three, Two class, Weighted 
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Figure B23. Order Three, Multi class, Unweighted 
 
 
Figure B24. Order Three, Multi class, Weighted 
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Figure B25. Order One, One class, Unweighted, Pseudo Timing 
 
 
Figure B26. Order One, One class, Weighted, Pseudo Timing 
57 
 
 
 
Figure B27. Order One, Two class, Unweighted, Pseudo Timing 
 
 
Figure B28. Order One, Two class, Weighted, Pseudo Timing 
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Figure B29. Order One, Multi class, Unweighted, Pseudo Timing 
 
 
Figure B30. Order One, Multi class, Weighted, Pseudo Timing 
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Figure B31. Order Two, One class, Unweighted, Pseudo Timing 
 
 
Figure B32. Order Two, One class, Weighted, Pseudo Timing 
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Figure B33. Order Two, Two class, Unweighted, Pseudo Timing  
 
 
Figure B34. Order Two, Two class, Weighted, Pseudo Timing 
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Figure B35. Order Two, Multi class, Unweighted, Pseudo Timing 
 
 
Figure B36. Order Two, Multi class, Weighted, Pseudo Timing 
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APPENDIX C. PORTSWEEP ATTACK DATASET SPRT GRAPHS 
Portseep  is a set of attacks from the 1998 DARPA intrusion detection evaluation dataset. 
Included for reference is an organized listing of SPRT graphs calculated under explained 
Conditions. 
DARPA Description:  Surveillance sweep through many ports to determine which services are 
supported on a single host.  
 
Data Counts 
Table C1. Data Counts 
 Training Testing 
Flows 4 1 
Transitions 5406 66 
Packets 6193 283 
 
Training Dataset 
 
Figure C1. Portsweep Order 1 Training Dataset Histogram  
 
 Figure C2. Portsweep Order 3 Training Dataset Histogram  
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Figure C3. Portsweep Order 3 Training Dataset Histogram  
 
Testing Data Histograms 
  
Figure C4. Portsweep Order 1 Testing Dataset Histogram  
 
Figure C5. Portsweep Order 2 Testing Dataset Histogram  
 
 
Figure C6. Portsweep Order 3 Testing Dataset Histogram  
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SPRT Graphs 
 
 Figure C7. Order One, One class, Unweighted
  
Figure C8.Order One, One class, Weighted 
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Figure C9. Order One, Two class, Unweighted 
 
  
Figure C10. Order One, Two class, Weighted 
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Figure C11. Order One, Multi class, Unweighted 
  
Figure C12. Order One, Multi class, Weighted 
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Figure C13. Order Two, One class, Unweighted 
  
Figure C14. Order Two, One class, Weighted 
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Figure C15. Order Two, Two class, Unweighted 
 
 
Figure C16. Order Two, Two class, Weighted 
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Figure C17. Order Two, Multi class, Unweighted 
Figure C18. Order Two, Multi class, Weighted 
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Figure C19. Order Three, One class, Unweighted 
 
 
Figure C20. Order Three, One class, Weighted 
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Figure C21. Order Three, Two class, Unweighted 
  
Figure C22. Order Three, Two class, Weighted 
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Figure C23. Order Three, Multi class, Unweighted 
 
  Figure C24. Order Three, Multi class, Weighted 
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  Figure C25. Order One, One class, Unweighted, Pseudo Timing 
 
  Figure C26. Order One, One class, Weighted, Pseudo Timing 
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  Figure C27. Order One, Two class, Unweighted, Pseudo Timing 
 
  Figure C28. Order One, Two class, Weighted, Pseudo Timing 
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  Figure C29. Order One, Multi class, Unweighted, Pseudo Timing 
 
  Figure C30. Order One, Multi class, Weighted, Pseudo Timing 
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  Figure C31. Order Two, One class, Unweighted, Pseudo Timing 
 
  Figure C32. Order Two, One class, Weighted, Pseudo Timing 
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  Figure C33. Order Two, Two class, Unweighted, Pseudo Timing  
 
  Figure C34. Order Two, Two class, Weighted, Pseudo Timing 
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  Figure C35. Order Two, Multi class, Unweighted, Pseudo Timing 
 
  Figure C36. Order Two, Multi class, Weighted, Pseudo Timing 
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APPENDIX D. SATAN ATTACK DATASET SPRT GRAPHS 
Satan is a set of attacks from the 1998 DARPA intrusion detection evaluation dataset. Included 
for reference is an organized listing of SPRT graphs calculated under explained Conditions. 
DARPA Description:  Network probing tool which looks for well-known weaknesses. 
Data Counts 
Table D1. Data Counts  
 Training Testing 
Flows 2 2 
Transitions 7189 247 
Packets 8957 320 
 
Training Dataset  
 
 Figure D1. Satan Order 1 Training Dataset Histogram  
   
 Figure D2. Satan Order 3 Training Dataset Histogram  
 
Figure D3. Satan Order 3 Training Dataset Histogram  
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Testing Dataset Histograms 
   
 
Figure D4. Satan Order 1 Testing Dataset Histogram  
   
Figure D5. Satan Order 2 Testing Dataset Histogram  
    
Figure D6. Satan Order 3 Testing Dataset Histogram  
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SPRT Graphs 
  
 
 Figure D7. Order One, One class, Unweighted   
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  Figure D8.Order One, One class, Weighted 
  
 
  Figure D9. Order One, Two class, Unweighted 
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   Figure D10. Order One, Two class, Weighted 
  
   Figure D11. Order One, Multi class, Unweighted 
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    Figure D12. Order One, Multi class, Weighted 
  
   Figure D13. Order Two, One class, Unweighted 
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 Figure D14. Order Two, One class, Weighted 
 
 Figure D15. Order Two, Two class, Unweighted 
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Figure D16. Order Two, Two class, Weighted 
 
 Figure D17. Order Two, Multi class, Unweighted 
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  Figure D18. Order Two, Multi class, Weighted 
 
 
   Figure D19. Order Three, One class, Unweighted 
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   Figure D20. Order Three, One class, Weighted 
  
   Figure D21. Order Three, Two class, Unweighted 
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Figure D22. Order Three, Two class, Weighted 
  
 
Figure D23. Order Three, Multi class, Unweighted 
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  Figure D24. Order Three, Multi class, Weighted 
   
  Figure D25. Order One, One class, Unweighted, Pseudo Timing 
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  Figure D26. Order One, One class, Weighted, Pseudo Timing 
 
 
  Figure D27. Order One, Two class, Unweighted, Pseudo Timing 
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  Figure D28. Order One, Two class, Weighted, Pseudo Timing 
   
  Figure D29. Order One, Multi class, Unweighted, Pseudo Timing 
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  Figure D30. Order One, Multi class, Weighted, Pseudo Timing 
  
 
  Figure D31. Order Two, One class, Unweighted, Pseudo Timing 
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  Figure D32. Order Two, One class, Weighted, Pseudo Timing 
  
 
  Figure D33. Order Two, Two class, Unweighted, Pseudo Timing  
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  Figure D34. Order Two, Two class, Weighted, Pseudo Timing 
  
 
  Figure D35. Order Two, Multi class, Unweighted, Pseudo Timing 
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  Figure D36. Order Two, Multi class, Weighted, Pseudo Timing 
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APPENDIX E. WAREZ ATTACK DATASET SPRT GRAPHS 
Portseep  is a set of attacks from the 1998 DARPA intrusion detection evaluation dataset. 
Included for reference is an organized listing of SPRT graphs calculated under explained 
Conditions. 
DARPA Description:  User logs into anonymous FTP site and creates a hidden directory. 
 
Data Counts 
Table E1. Data Counts 
 Training Testing 
Flows 21 40 
Transitions 50512 179084 
Packets 131299 312619 
 
Training Dataset   
Figure E1. Warez Order 1 Training Dataset Histogram  
 
 
 Figure E2. Warez Order 3 Training Dataset Histogram  
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Figure E3. Warez Order 3 Training Dataset Histogram  
 
Testing Dataset Histograms 
  
 
Figure E4. Warez Order 1 Testing Dataset Histogram  
  
Figure E5. Warez Order 2 Testing Dataset Histogram  
   
Figure E6. Warez Order 3 Testing Dataset Histogram  
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SPRT Graphs 
 
 
 Figure E7. Order One, One class, Unweighted   
 
Figure E8.Order One, One class, Weighted 
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Figure E9. Order One, Two class, Unweighted 
 
   Figure E10. Order One, Two class, Weighted 
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   Figure E11. Order One, Multi class, Unweighted 
   
Figure E12. Order One, Multi class, Weighted 
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   Figure E13. Order Two, One class, Unweighted 
   
 Figure E14. Order Two, One class, Weighted 
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 Figure E15. Order Two, Two class, Unweighted 
    
Figure E16. Order Two, Two class, Weighted 
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Figure E17. Order Two, Multi class, Unweighted 
 
Figure E18. Order Two, Multi class, Weighted 
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   Figure E19. Order Three, One class, Unweighted 
 
   Figure E20. Order Three, One class, Weighted 
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   Figure E21. Order Three, Two class, Unweighted 
    
Figure E22. Order Three, Two class, Weighted 
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Figure E23. Order Three, Multi class, Unweighted 
 
 
  Figure E24. Order Three, Multi class, Weighted 
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  Figure E25. Order One, One class, Unweighted, Pseudo Timing 
 
 
  Figure E26. Order One, One class, Weighted, Pseudo Timing 
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  Figure E27. Order One, Two class, Unweighted, Pseudo Timing 
 
 
  Figure E28. Order One, Two class, Weighted, Pseudo Timing 
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  Figure E29. Order One, Multi class, Unweighted, Pseudo Timing 
  
  Figure E30. Order One, Multi class, Weighted, Pseudo Timing 
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  Figure E31. Order Two, One class, Unweighted, Pseudo Timing 
  
  Figure E32. Order Two, One class, Weighted, Pseudo Timing 
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  Figure E33. Order Two, Two class, Unweighted, Pseudo Timing  
 
 
  Figure E34. Order Two, Two class, Weighted, Pseudo Timing 
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  Figure E35. Order Two, Multi class, Unweighted, Pseudo Timing 
 
 
  Figure E36. Order Two, Multi class, Weighted, Pseudo Timing 
